Kaplan v Chertoff 06-5304 (PAED, 2006)
"The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike”
under the law. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Its purpose “is to secure every person . . . against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
There are two manners in which a statute may be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. The first challenge involves a claim that the statute, on its face, expressly discriminates in an impermissible way. The second challenge involves a claim that the statute, while perhaps valid on its face, violates the Equal Protection Clause in its execution, because it results in intentional disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals.
In this case, Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge is not a facial attack of any particular CIS policy; rather Plaintiffs attack the unequal implementation of CIS policy among different aliens. The viability of a claim challenging the unequal
implementation of a statute is well established.
“[D]iscriminatory enforcement of a facially valid law is also unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.” Hill v.
City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). Public officials engage in unconstitutional discriminatory application or administration of a facially impartial law when they seek to enforce the law “on the basis of an unjustifiable standard, such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary factor,” or when they seek to enforce the law in order “to prevent the exercise of a fundamental right.” United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 995 (1989). In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that required a license to operate a laundromat where such a license had been granted to
only one out 200 Asians. 118 U.S. at 374. The Supreme Court concluded that a law which is “fair on its face and impartial in its appearance” may nonetheless constitute “illegal discrimination between persons” “if it is applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand.” Id. at 373-74.
Allegations that a statute has a disparate effect are not sufficient, on their own, to state an equal protection claim.
A plaintiff must also show that the defendant intended to discriminate in a manner that led to the disparate effect."
"The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike”
under the law. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Its purpose “is to secure every person . . . against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
There are two manners in which a statute may be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. The first challenge involves a claim that the statute, on its face, expressly discriminates in an impermissible way. The second challenge involves a claim that the statute, while perhaps valid on its face, violates the Equal Protection Clause in its execution, because it results in intentional disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals.
In this case, Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge is not a facial attack of any particular CIS policy; rather Plaintiffs attack the unequal implementation of CIS policy among different aliens. The viability of a claim challenging the unequal
implementation of a statute is well established.
“[D]iscriminatory enforcement of a facially valid law is also unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.” Hill v.
City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). Public officials engage in unconstitutional discriminatory application or administration of a facially impartial law when they seek to enforce the law “on the basis of an unjustifiable standard, such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary factor,” or when they seek to enforce the law in order “to prevent the exercise of a fundamental right.” United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 995 (1989). In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that required a license to operate a laundromat where such a license had been granted to
only one out 200 Asians. 118 U.S. at 374. The Supreme Court concluded that a law which is “fair on its face and impartial in its appearance” may nonetheless constitute “illegal discrimination between persons” “if it is applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand.” Id. at 373-74.
Allegations that a statute has a disparate effect are not sufficient, on their own, to state an equal protection claim.
A plaintiff must also show that the defendant intended to discriminate in a manner that led to the disparate effect."
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