when did I followed thoses stats? Show me the post
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Do you think they catched duplicate entries?
- Thread starter jayo2k
- Start date
DOS has not published any quantitative data for fraud level. Only qualitative data, like with the phonebook which was entered into the system, and probably, several times by several different companies. Does that mean you are going to disregard any obvious calculations?Where the hell do you get the 86.45%...? Are you just calculating that to make your stat correct?
Because that what it seem, you just put thoses stats to make your stats correct...
SHOW US ANY OFFICIAL LINK WHERE WE SEE THE 86.45% of disquilified entries pls...
I give up, you won...
DOS has not published any quantitative data for fraud level. Only qualitative data, like with the phonebook which was entered into the system, and probably, several times by several different companies. Does that mean you are going to disregard any obvious calculations?
DOS has not published any quantitative data for fraud level.
Really? I read they did say some quantity.
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KCC has made several improvements to its processing of the DV lottery entries to detect multiple entries and to screen cases for possible fraud indicators before they are sent to consular posts for adjudication. KCC piloted facial recognition software in 2001 and, in 2003, moved to an electronic application process, known as e-DV. Both facial recognition and e-DV improve KCC’s ability to detect multiple entries and to detect possible fraud indicators. Prior to this, the DV lottery was paper-based, which made it difficult for KCC employees to catch multiple entries. Now, all e-DV entries go through electronic and manual procedures to screen out ineligible entries. The entries are screened electronically for exact duplicate digital photographs or biographic information; exact duplicates are disqualified. Next, all principal applicant entries selected in the lottery are checked with facial recognition software against galleries (by region and by gender) drawn from the entire e-DV database to further eliminate duplicate entries based on photo matches. Possible matches are returned to KCC’s facial recognition technicians, who then make a determination on whether or not a valid match exists. KCC reported that it detected 7,622 multiple entries in 2005, 7,166 in 2006, and 3,969 in 2007. KCC’s fraud prevention manager attributed the decreasing number to the success of facial recognition software, suggesting that applicants and visa industry consultants were not submitting as many multiple entries because they had learned that KCC would detect and disqualify them.
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very informative. IF this is true, that mean the 86.45% disqualify is not true because that would make more than 1 million disqualify
4K out of 82K winners in DV2007, 5% of selectees, suggesting 5% of total entrants were considered illegitimate, that's it.
If 82K includes derivatives, it should be less than 5% because 4K is number of entries (PA only).
And, at this point, perhaps KCC recognizes some other kind of fraud, such as phonebook fraud, but there is no evidence that they detected & disqualified them.
deriviatives are not counted in the selected
4K out of 82K winners in DV2007, 5% of selectees, suggesting 5% of total entrants were considered illegitimate, that's it.
If 82K includes derivatives, it should be less than 5% because 4K is number of entries (PA only).
And, at this point, perhaps KCC recognizes some other kind of fraud, such as phonebook fraud, but there is no evidence that they detected & disqualified them.
Those 4K are the ones detected with face recognition software.And, at this point, perhaps KCC recognizes some other kind of fraud, such as phonebook fraud, but there is no evidence that they detected & disqualified them.
Others could include:
1. Duplicate entries detected without face recognition software. Just because the pictures coinside as files.
2. Entries that use picture from previous years. Detected without face recognition software.
3. Just invalid pictures (empty ones).
4. Many others.
I think those 86% mainly include types 1 and 2.
Those 4K are the ones detected with face recognition software.
Others could include:
1. Duplicate entries detected without face recognition software. Just because the pictures coinside as files.
2. Entries that use picture from previous years. Detected without face recognition software.
3. Just invalid pictures (empty ones).
4. Many others.
Include or not, 4K is 4K and that's what they did for DV2007. And duplicate entries are supposed to be decreasing, no evidence of increasing over year since e-DV began. As in the transcript of the interview video describing DV2012 selection procedure, DOS will be getting rid of duplicate entries which would be only 5% (or less) of 1st round selectees and no evidence of additional procedure for disqualification. The reality is that DOS could put red flag on potential fraud cases for the final step that is the interview, because as a common sense fraudulent looks normal and careless error looks fraudulent. This idea is consistent with the wording "visa refusal rate is quite high" or something like that in a recent article you cited somewhere. Most likely it is hard to determine an entry is fraud for 100% sure. Moreover, official DV instruction says only "recent photo" and it does not define how long is "recent", like "1 year-old photo is not considered as recent photo".
I think those 86% mainly include types 1 and 2.
No evidence at all. Any belief is fine, but reality is located outside of your brain.
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Include or not, 4K is 4K and that's what they did for DV2007. And duplicate entries are supposed to be decreasing, no evidence of increasing over year since e-DV began. As in the transcript of the interview video describing DV2012 selection procedure, DOS will be getting rid of duplicate entries which would be only 5% (or less) of 1st round selectees and no evidence of additional procedure for disqualification.
In the section devoted to the success of facial recognition software do not expect to have data for what is achieved through other means.
They could. But then it would create enormous amount of work for the consulates. If at least 86% are thrown out at the consulate, that means consulates are not using their time effectively.The reality is that DOS could put red flag on potential fraud cases for the final step that is the interview, because as a common sense fraudulent looks normal and careless error looks fraudulent.
It is clearly defined as 6 months. Definitely, 1-year photo is beyond any possible limits.This idea is consistent with the wording "visa refusal rate is quite high" or something like that in a recent article you cited somewhere. Most likely it is hard to determine an entry is fraud for 100% sure. Moreover, official DV instruction says only "recent photo" and it does not define how long is "recent", like "1 year-old photo is not considered as recent photo".
Published qualitative evidence is very strong that the fraud level in Bangladesh is very highNo evidence at all. Any belief is fine, but reality is located outside of your brain.
Qualitative evidences of high fraud in Bangladesh include (but are not limited to) the following:
Everything described above happens outside of my brain. However, it is obviously ignored by your brain.
At the same time, the percentage of visas issued in Dhaka is:
DV-2007 60%
DV-2008 38%
DV-2009 44%
With the extremely high level of fraud described above, the consulates still issue very high percent of visas to DV applicants. Why is that? Obviously, because most of fraudulent cases are somehow disqualified at KCC. The ways how KCC could legally disqualify them are mentioned earlier
For example, consular officers at the U.S. embassy in Dhaka, Bangladesh, said that some unscrupulous visa agents use their own address on DV entry forms so that KCC’s notification letters are delivered to them instead of to the person selected in the lottery. The agents have then, in some cases, held these letters for up to $20,000 in ransom, or offered to reduce this fee if the legitimate DV winner agreed to marry a person of the agent’s choosing—who had also paid a fee to the agent—and to add this new spouse to the visa application
For example, according to the U.S. embassy in Dhaka, Bangladesh has one of the lowest internet access and usage rates in the world, yet it has provided the highest number of principal entrants, not including dependents, into the DV lottery in 2006, 2007, and 2008; a December 2006 cable from the U.S. embassy in Dhaka attributed Bangladesh’s large number of entrants solely to the visa industry. Some visa consultants offer legitimate help, such as preparing and submitting DV entry forms, but several consular officers said many also encourage unqualified applicants to enter the DV lottery, submit multiple or incorrect entries, and take advantage of their clients in a multitude of ways.
With the winning notification letter in hand, the agents can then demand thousands of dollars from the applicant in exchange for the letter; an August 2006 cable from the U.S. embassy in Accra cited an example where agents charged $2,500 for such an exchange, while consular officers in Dhaka suspected that the fee could range between $10,000 and $20,000.
A March 2007 cable from the U.S. embassy in Dhaka noted that, in Bangladesh, visa agents posted fake job advertisements to collect biographic data and enter individuals without their knowledge. If one of these individuals won the lottery, the visa agent would either extort money in exchange for the notification letter or threaten to steal the individual’s identity. A consular officer in Dhaka said that the diversity visa is referred to as the “Visa of Tears” by some Bangladeshis because of the suffering associated with it.
In Dhaka, consular officers suspected that visa facilitators use the availability of fake documents to substitute imposters in DV cases under their control if they cannot receive sufficient payment from the real applicant.
For example, consular officers in Dhaka said that DV applicants presented handwritten education documents that could be easily forged or altered, and reported that school officials were willing to issue authentic documents with false information
Officials from Consular Affairs’ Office of Fraud Prevention Programs (FPP) said that they could not gauge the extent of DV fraud overall and that they did not analyze DV fraud in isolation, as their fraud prevention initiatives were aimed at combating all types of visa fraud, regardless of category. However, they said they had recently implemented fraud tracking software to collect more data from posts, such as when an officer suspected that fraudulent documents were used or when officers referred a DV case to the post’s fraud prevention unit. An FPP official shared some preliminary results from the first three quarters of fiscal year 2007: 31 DV-issuing posts had referred 1081 DV cases to the posts’ fraud prevention units. Eight of these posts had each referred more than 60 cases to their fraud prevention unit; Dhaka had referred 121 cases and Warsaw had referred 173. The official said that FPP was still working out some glitches with the fraud tracking program, but was hopeful that the data collected could clarify where DV fraud was most prevalent
A 2002 cable from the U.S. embassy in Dhaka stated that the ease with which individuals can obtain genuine identity documents in any assumed identity, including passports, creates an “open door” for terrorists wishing to enter the United States with legal status.
Consular officers in Dhaka brief DV applicants in the waiting room every morning to remind them of the requirements, the consequences of committing fraud, and that the fee is nonrefundable. However, consular officers consistently said that some DV applicants still hold misconceptions; the officers suspect that they do not trust information they receive from the U.S. government, preferring to trust members of their own community as sources of information.
In addition to public diplomacy efforts, DV posts also use a variety of antifraud tools to combat fraud after the applicant has come to the post for visa adjudication. Consular officers review the applicant’s documents, along with any fraud notes from KCC, and scrutinize the applicant during the visa interview. The consular chief in Dhaka said the post’s best antifraud tool is good interviewing skills.
The U.S. embassy in Dhaka also has a busy fraud prevention unit and an assistant regional security officer for investigations whom consular officers said was very helpful with DV fraud investigations
Posts such as Dhaka and Warsaw have sent cables to State headquarters reporting that e-DV has facilitated unscrupulous visa agents’ scams. In December 2006, the U.S. embassy in Dhaka reported that, although e-DV had reduced some traditional types of DV fraud, it had facilitated a new type of widespread extortion and identity theft fraud since e-DV effectively had given control of the program to visa facilitators who had internet access and English language skills, unlike many potential applicants in Bangladesh. A June 2006 cable from Warsaw reported that e-DV opened a new avenue for fraud that was previously inhibited by the personal signature requirement on the paper version of the lottery; e-DV allowed visa agents to use “phished” biographic data to enter individuals without their knowledge and then coerce them into sham marriages. Although consular officers said the DV applicants who entered the lottery with the assistance of a visa facilitator are frequently too intimidated or threatened to admit that they did so, State has not attempted to quantify the effect of visa industry involvement.
Everything described above happens outside of my brain. However, it is obviously ignored by your brain.
At the same time, the percentage of visas issued in Dhaka is:
DV-2007 60%
DV-2008 38%
DV-2009 44%
With the extremely high level of fraud described above, the consulates still issue very high percent of visas to DV applicants. Why is that? Obviously, because most of fraudulent cases are somehow disqualified at KCC. The ways how KCC could legally disqualify them are mentioned earlier
Everything described above happens outside of my brain. However, it is obviously ignored by your brain.
Those description you cited is pretty consistent with mine. They are still struggling with plenty of fraud "selectees".
At the same time, the percentage of visas issued in Dhaka is:
DV-2007 60%
DV-2008 38%
DV-2009 44%
With the extremely high level of fraud described above, the consulates still issue very high percent of visas to DV applicants. Why is that? Obviously, because most of fraudulent cases are somehow disqualified at KCC. The ways how KCC could legally disqualify them are mentioned earlier
While your calculation is simple, your interpretation is tricky. First, we don't know how many people out of approx.6000 winners showed up at the interview, it is what I call demand. If we assume demand is similar over year(DV2007-2009), we are able to argue the trend of visa issuance rate, which is getting worse and/or not improved despite their effort to eliminate fraud cases at early step. Again we don't know the exact issuance rate which could be less than 40% and could be more than 60%, depending on demand.
Second, putting aside above tricky values, here I attempt to argue whether or not 40-60% of visa issuance is considered "high" under "high" fraud level. Although I don't see any official publication disclosing DV category visa issuance (or refusal) rate since 1996, visa refusal rate of FY1996 would be useful for this argument.
http://www.cis.org/articles/1997/IR28/visa_lottery.html
Of course fraud level of Bangladesh was recognized to be extremely high in 1996 and DV visa issuance rate was 56% at Dhaka. So, again we don't know the exact rate for recent DV visa though, more than 70% of issuance is considered "higher" or "improved" as compared to the past "anti-fraud measure".
Third, if you have concrete evidence or documents to prove winning number such as 6000 in Bangladesh includes family member, let me know.
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True. But we could calculate the same figures for other countries. And I see that the median is 35%. The numbers for Bangladesh are much higher.While your calculation is simple, your interpretation is tricky. First, we don't know how many people out of approx.6000 winners showed up at the interview, it is what I call demand.
Yes, you are right. But do you think there is any reason why bangladeshi's rate of attending the interview would differ much from other countries?If we assume demand is similar over year(DV2007-2009), we are able to argue the trend of visa issuance rate, which is getting worse and/or not improved despite their effort to eliminate fraud cases at early step. Again we don't know the exact issuance rate which could be less than 40% and could be more than 60%, depending on demand.
In 1997 there were no anti-fraud measures in place. No facial recognition software. No electronic forms. Nothing like that. The process has changes a lot since that. I would not use those figures now as a way to explain recent staff.Second, putting aside above tricky values, here I attempt to argue whether or not 40-60% of visa issuance is considered "high" under "high" fraud level. Although I don't see any official publication disclosing DV category visa issuance (or refusal) rate since 1996, visa refusal rate of FY1996 would be useful for this argument.
http://www.cis.org/articles/1997/IR28/visa_lottery.html
A typical statement from DOS visa bulletin looks like this:Third, if you have concrete evidence or documents to prove winning number such as 6000 in Bangladesh includes family member, let me know
Also, quote from WolfsdorfApproximately 100,000 applicants have been registered and notified and may now make an application for an immigrant visa
Still any doubts? About 100,000 potential immigrant visa applicants competing for 50,000 visas.With more than 100,000 winners competing for 50,000 visas, winning the lottery implies a race to the finish as less than half of winners actually obtain immigrant visas
A typical statement from DOS visa bulletin looks like this:
registered and notified. A and B.
Derivatives are not notified in fact.
Also, quote from Wolfsdorf
More than 100,000, less than half.... It is still true even if 6000 is PA only....
Not clear to me.
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That means that those who are registered and those who are notified count to 100,000 together. But the important thing is that those are the ones who could apply for an immigrant visa. Derivatives definitely could. And they are registered.registered and notified. A and B.
Derivatives are not notified in fact.
More is here because typically it is about 106000-110000. Not because it is 200000 with dependents.More than 100,000, less than half.... It is still true even if 6000 is PA only....
And less than half means that for more than 100,000 family members there are only 50,000 visas. Less than half of more than 100,000