That is a fair assessment of one aspect of the law, but there is another aspect you thoughts are not addressing. That is the laws that control the operation of immigration rules. That is NOT about the question of whether foreigners have rights or not, it is about whether *we* are implementing our laws in a fair and just way.
Section 202 (a)(1)(A) says "
(A) Except as specifically provided in paragraph (2) and in sections
101(a)(27) ,
201(b)(2)(A)(i) , and 203, no person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person's race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence."
That law was introduced several years after the paragraph that gave the president power to halt immigration from certain groups in the interests of the USA (212(f). Section 202 (a)(1)(A) excepts some other paragraphs, but NOT 212(f). A later law is considered to have been written with knowledge of earlier laws, so the lack of an exception toward 212(f) is important.
This is what the SCOTUS will have to consider in the fall.
True, in part - but this is a separate question from the question of how the administration will interpret the limitation of the temporary injunction.
At this stage it is not about the merits of the case but about the balance of interests. The court made it quite clear that it doesn't believe that foreign nationals, as such, have any vested interest in acquiring a visa. The authority of the President to restrict visas from certain countries based on national security consideration is something the court will probably address when it rules on the merits, but it seems unlikely that it would change its decision in the case of "unconnected" foreign nationals, given its somewhat belittling treatment of the INA in the current opinion. Section 202(a)(1)(A) is later in time, but it is very broad in application, making it subject to
lex specialis. It also focuses on the prohibition of
discrimination, which will probably be interpreted as the intention to discriminate based on irrelevant considerations. The real question is therefore whether the SC accepts the argument that the ban is, as it appears to be, is aimed against Muslims, as such. If so, the INA is of little importance anyway, since that would make the executive order in violation of the Establishment Clause. It's of course hard to tell what the court will decide, but given its harsh wording on foreign nationals, it seems like it is rather unsympathetic of this argument, as they seem to believe the (rather shaky, IMHO) argument that it is all about national security:
"(“[A]n unadmitted and nonresident alien . . . has no constitutional right of entry to this country”). So whatever burdens may result from enforcement of §2(c) against a foreign national who lacks any connection to this country, they are, at a minimum, a good deal less concrete than the hardships identified by the courts below. At the same time, the Government’s interest in enforcing §2(c), and the Executive’s authority to do so, are undoubtedly at their peak when there is no tie between the foreign national and the United States.". . . "The interest in preserving national security is “an urgent objective of the highest order.” [...] To prevent the Government from pursuing that objective by enforcing §2(c) against foreign nationals unconnected to the United States would appreciably injure its interests, without alleviating obvious hardship to anyone else."
The SC has shown time and again in the past that when it comes to the interpretation of constitutional and statutory principles with regard to the use of executive powers, foreign nationals, that are not under direct control of the US government, are of little import. It was willing to (silently) accept that if the president can have foreign nationals killed with impunity, it can also do a host of other unpleasant things to them, and that would seem to include arbitrarily denying them a visa (of course that line of argument referred to the commander in chief powers, but it is hardly unrelated to the regulation of foreign affairs). The only question that can really change that, with regard to unconnected foreign nationals, is whether the President indeed acted on religious grounds, and it seems like the SC is unwilling to accept this argument.