LateKnight
Registered Users (C)
IMMIGRATION LAW & POLICY
Removal Issues Concerning Criminal Convictions
BIA: YOUTHFUL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE "CONVICTION" FOR A CRIME UNDER THE INA (MATTER OF DEVISON-CHARLES)
Immigrants' Rights Update, Vol. 14, No. 6, October 19, 2000
The Board of Immigration Appeals has ruled, in a unanimous, en banc decision, that an adjudication of youthful offender status under New York law does not constitute a judgment of conviction for a crime under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The BIA also held that the respondent's subsequent resentencing following a probation violation did not convert the youthful offender violation into a judgment of conviction. The ruling confirms that the enactment of a statutory definition of "conviction" (INA § 101(a)(48)(A)) as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) did not affect longstanding BIA precedent holding that juvenile delinquency offenses do not constitute convictions under the INA.
The respondent, a Mr. Devison-Charles, is a citizen of the Dominican Republic who was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in April 1996. In August 1992, he pled guilty to attempted possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and in October of that year he was adjudicated to be a youthful offender under New York law and sentenced to five years' probation. In 1993 the probation was extended for an additional period. In 1998, after pleading guilty to violating his probation, Devison was sentenced to one year's imprisonment. At that time he was 25 years old.
In 1999 the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated removal proceedings against Devison, who appeared at his hearing unrepresented by counsel. At the hearing he submitted certified court records to show that he was a youthful offender rather than a convicted criminal. The INS contended that Devison's resentencing for the 1998 probation violation constituted a conviction for a controlled substance offense and that he did not qualify at that time for youthful offender treatment.
The immigration judge agreed, ruling that Devison was not eligible for youthful offender treatment at the time of the 1998 probation violation and that the resentencing constituted a conviction. Relying on the BIA's decision in Matter of Roldan, Int. Dec. No. 3377 (BIA 1999), the IJ further found that the new INA definition of "conviction" enacted as part of the IIRIRA eliminates the effect of state rehabilitative statutes such as the New York youthful offender statute. (For background about Roldan, see "9th Circuit Finds Expungement Can Eliminate Immigration Effects of Drug Conviction, Overruling BIA's Roldan Decision," Immigrants' Rights Update, Aug. 31, 2000, p. 7). Devision appealed the IJ's decision.
In ruling on the appeal, the BIA began by considering whether the 1992 youthful offender adjudication should be considered a conviction for immigration purposes in light of the INA's definition of the term. Citing its longstanding precedent to the effect that juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal proceedings, the BIA held that findings of juvenile delinquency are not convictions. The BIA also has held that the standards of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. sections 5031-42 (FJDA), govern whether an offense is considered an act of delinquency rather than a crime. Matter of De La Nues, 18 I. & N. Dec. 140 (BIA 1981). The BIA concluded, "We concur with the established view that juvenile delinquency adjudications are not criminal proceedings, but are adjudications that are civil in nature."
The BIA then examined the New York youthful offender adjudication procedures and found them "similar in nature and purpose" to the provisions of the FJDA. Under the New York statute, an individual is an "eligible youth" if he or she was at least 16 years old and less than 19 at the time of the offense and has not been convicted of a previous felony or adjudicated a youthful offender. If an eligible youth is determined to be a youthful offender, the court vacates the conviction, which has the legal effect of a reversal. The youthful offender finding is substituted for the conviction, and the individual is sentenced. The FJDA similarly applies to persons under the age of 21 who committed an offense prior to reaching age 18.
The BIA concluded that neither its holding in Roldan nor the IIRIRA definition of conviction "require(s) a departure from our nearly six decades of precedent decisions holding that juvenile adjudications are not convictions for purposes of federal immigration law." Indeed, the BIA found express support for this conclusion in another provision of the IIRIRA. Section 383 of the IIRIRA provides that individuals who committed acts of juvenile delinquency that would constitute felony crimes of violence if committed by an adult are ineligible for Family Unity status. This provision shows, the BIA noted, that Congress recognized juvenile delinquent adjudications are not convictions, for otherwise this section would be superfluous.
The BIA also distinguished between a juvenile delinquency adjudication and an expungement or deferred adjudication, on the grounds that the juvenile delinquency adjudication eliminates the conviction for all time, without regard to whether the individual subsequently completes probation or other conditions of punishment. "This is a dispositive difference, because a juvenile adjudication cannot become a conviction based on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of subsequent events." For this very reason, the BIA also found that the respondent's 1998 resentencing did not convert his youthful offender adjudication into a conviction. The BIA therefore sustained the appeal and terminated removal proceedings.
Matter of Devison-Charles, Int. Dec. No. 3435 (BIA Sept. 12, 2000).
Removal Issues Concerning Criminal Convictions
BIA: YOUTHFUL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE "CONVICTION" FOR A CRIME UNDER THE INA (MATTER OF DEVISON-CHARLES)
Immigrants' Rights Update, Vol. 14, No. 6, October 19, 2000
The Board of Immigration Appeals has ruled, in a unanimous, en banc decision, that an adjudication of youthful offender status under New York law does not constitute a judgment of conviction for a crime under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The BIA also held that the respondent's subsequent resentencing following a probation violation did not convert the youthful offender violation into a judgment of conviction. The ruling confirms that the enactment of a statutory definition of "conviction" (INA § 101(a)(48)(A)) as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) did not affect longstanding BIA precedent holding that juvenile delinquency offenses do not constitute convictions under the INA.
The respondent, a Mr. Devison-Charles, is a citizen of the Dominican Republic who was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in April 1996. In August 1992, he pled guilty to attempted possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and in October of that year he was adjudicated to be a youthful offender under New York law and sentenced to five years' probation. In 1993 the probation was extended for an additional period. In 1998, after pleading guilty to violating his probation, Devison was sentenced to one year's imprisonment. At that time he was 25 years old.
In 1999 the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated removal proceedings against Devison, who appeared at his hearing unrepresented by counsel. At the hearing he submitted certified court records to show that he was a youthful offender rather than a convicted criminal. The INS contended that Devison's resentencing for the 1998 probation violation constituted a conviction for a controlled substance offense and that he did not qualify at that time for youthful offender treatment.
The immigration judge agreed, ruling that Devison was not eligible for youthful offender treatment at the time of the 1998 probation violation and that the resentencing constituted a conviction. Relying on the BIA's decision in Matter of Roldan, Int. Dec. No. 3377 (BIA 1999), the IJ further found that the new INA definition of "conviction" enacted as part of the IIRIRA eliminates the effect of state rehabilitative statutes such as the New York youthful offender statute. (For background about Roldan, see "9th Circuit Finds Expungement Can Eliminate Immigration Effects of Drug Conviction, Overruling BIA's Roldan Decision," Immigrants' Rights Update, Aug. 31, 2000, p. 7). Devision appealed the IJ's decision.
In ruling on the appeal, the BIA began by considering whether the 1992 youthful offender adjudication should be considered a conviction for immigration purposes in light of the INA's definition of the term. Citing its longstanding precedent to the effect that juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal proceedings, the BIA held that findings of juvenile delinquency are not convictions. The BIA also has held that the standards of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. sections 5031-42 (FJDA), govern whether an offense is considered an act of delinquency rather than a crime. Matter of De La Nues, 18 I. & N. Dec. 140 (BIA 1981). The BIA concluded, "We concur with the established view that juvenile delinquency adjudications are not criminal proceedings, but are adjudications that are civil in nature."
The BIA then examined the New York youthful offender adjudication procedures and found them "similar in nature and purpose" to the provisions of the FJDA. Under the New York statute, an individual is an "eligible youth" if he or she was at least 16 years old and less than 19 at the time of the offense and has not been convicted of a previous felony or adjudicated a youthful offender. If an eligible youth is determined to be a youthful offender, the court vacates the conviction, which has the legal effect of a reversal. The youthful offender finding is substituted for the conviction, and the individual is sentenced. The FJDA similarly applies to persons under the age of 21 who committed an offense prior to reaching age 18.
The BIA concluded that neither its holding in Roldan nor the IIRIRA definition of conviction "require(s) a departure from our nearly six decades of precedent decisions holding that juvenile adjudications are not convictions for purposes of federal immigration law." Indeed, the BIA found express support for this conclusion in another provision of the IIRIRA. Section 383 of the IIRIRA provides that individuals who committed acts of juvenile delinquency that would constitute felony crimes of violence if committed by an adult are ineligible for Family Unity status. This provision shows, the BIA noted, that Congress recognized juvenile delinquent adjudications are not convictions, for otherwise this section would be superfluous.
The BIA also distinguished between a juvenile delinquency adjudication and an expungement or deferred adjudication, on the grounds that the juvenile delinquency adjudication eliminates the conviction for all time, without regard to whether the individual subsequently completes probation or other conditions of punishment. "This is a dispositive difference, because a juvenile adjudication cannot become a conviction based on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of subsequent events." For this very reason, the BIA also found that the respondent's 1998 resentencing did not convert his youthful offender adjudication into a conviction. The BIA therefore sustained the appeal and terminated removal proceedings.
Matter of Devison-Charles, Int. Dec. No. 3435 (BIA Sept. 12, 2000).